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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. MIC November 2013
  5. A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information
  6. Full Text

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Article Full-Text Access

Armantier, Olivier, Charles A. Holt and Charles R. Plott. 2013. "A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (4): 142–62.
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