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  2. ASSA Annual Meeting
  3. 2026
  4. Preliminary Program
  5. Digital Money
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Digital Money

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 3, 2026 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (EST)

Marriott Philadelphia Downtown
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Emre Ozdenoren, London Business School

Strategic Money and Credit Ledgers

Markus K. Brunnermeier
,
Princeton University
Jonathan Payne
,
Princeton University

Abstract

Can a digital “bills-of-exchange” system be established? We show that a sufficiently dominant trading platform can and will set up a ledger that allows f irms to purchase inputs by issuing tradable IOUs, which then serve as a savings vehicle and medium of exchange. The platform can incentivize the use of the ledger, and enforce repayment, by threatening exclusion from future trade, something that a stand-alone ledger cannot. In GE this lowers the equilibrium interest rate, but also increases the platform’s rent extraction. A public payment alternative that is competitive, but not too competitive, improves output and consumption.

Platform Money

Emre Ozdenoren
,
London Business School
Yuan Tian
,
London School of Economics
Kathy Yuan
,
London School of Economics

Abstract

This paper examines how a platform’s ability to create its own money affects its pricing decisions, the search and matching dynamics between buyers and sellers, and overall economic welfare. We show that by pricing in its own currency, the platform can extract seignorage from buyers while imposing higher fees on sellers. In contrast, the legacy market—lacking private money—cannot recoup seignorage from buyers and thus operates at a competitive disadvantage, even when inflation costs are less salient compared to direct fees. In environments where the platform’s technology is symmetric with that of the legacy market, the resulting market tightness on the platform is lower than socially optimal. However, when the platform’s technology is superior, the introduction of platform money moves the equilibrium closer to the social optimum compared to a fee-only platform.

Money and Barter in the Field

Michael Bo-lin Wong
,
Hong Kong University

Abstract

Much of the theory in monetary economics supposes that money overcomes the inefficiencies of barter, but the theory has been untested because appropriate field data were unavailable. A new high-frequency transaction-level dataset from a Toronto-based barter community tests the predictions that money circulation increases trade volume, and that money redeemability may be necessary for money circulation. Using interrupted time-series designs, I find that a large increase in the level of digital currency supply persistently increased token-mediated trade without reducing barter trade. Subsequent partial and complete halts in redemption persistently reduced token acceptance, velocity, barter trade, as well as token-mediated trade.

Competing Digital Monies: The impact of CBDC

Jon Frost
,
Bank of International Settlement
Jean-Charles Rochet
,
Toulouse School of Economics
Hyun Song Shin
,
Bank of International Settlement
Marianne Verdier
,
Université Paris Panthéon-Assas

Abstract

The paper studies the impact of competition between stablecoins issuers, bank transfer, and CBDCs. It analyzes the advantage of CBDCs over public regulations on competitions payment and credit provision.

Discussant(s)
Will Cong
,
Cornell University
Christine Parlour
,
University of California-Berkeley
Alfred Lehar
,
University of Calgary
Rod Garratt
,
University of California-Santa Barbara
JEL Classifications
  • G0 - General
  • E4 - Money and Interest Rates