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Discrimination in Health Care

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 4, 2019 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

Atlanta Marriott Marquis, International 4
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Joanna Lahey, Texas A&M University and NBER

When Is the Next Available?: A Field Experiment Measuring Race and Ethnicity Discrimination in Booking Medical Appointments

Brigham Walker
,
Tulane University
Janna Wisniewski
,
Tulane University
Patrick Button
,
Tulane University, RAND Corporation, and IZA

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment – an audit study – to assess discrimination faced by African-Americans and Hispanics in accessing primary medical care. Callers who are either African-American, Hispanic, or non-Hispanic White call doctor's offices, using a standardized script, to attempt to book medical appointments. We measure discrimination by comparing appointment offer rates, time-to-appointment, and questions posed to our prospective patients. Race and ethnicity are disclosed in the calls by through names and/or voice (linguistic profiling.) We find interesting disparities, where African-American and Hispanic callers are offered more appointments, but they wait significantly longer for their appointments.

Interpreting Signals in the Labor Market: Evidence from Medical Referrals

Heather Sarsons
,
Harvard University

Abstract

This paper provides evidence that a person's gender influences the way others interpret information about his or her ability and documents the implications for gender inequality in labor markets. Using data on physicians' referrals to surgical specialists, I find that referring physicians view patient outcomes differently depending on the performing surgeon's gender. Physicians become more pessimistic about a female surgeon's ability than a male's after a patient death, indicated by a sharper drop in referrals to the female surgeon. However, physicians become more optimistic about a male surgeon's ability after a good patient outcome, indicated by a larger increase in the number of referrals the male surgeon receives. Physicians also change their behavior toward other female surgeons after a bad experience with one female surgeon, becoming less likely to refer to new women in the same specialty. There are no such spillovers to other men after a bad experience with one male surgeon. Consistent with learning models, physicians' reactions to events are strongest when they have just begun to refer to a surgeon. However, the empirical patterns are consistent with Bayesian learning only if physicians do not have rational expectations about the true distribution of surgeon ability.

Gender Homophily in Referral Networks: Consequences for the Medicare Physician Earnings Gap

Dan Zeltzer
,
Tel Aviv University and IZA

Abstract

In this paper, I assess the extent to which the gender gap in physician earnings may be driven by physicians’ preference for working with specialists of the same gender. By analyzing administrative data on 100 million Medicare patient referrals, I provide robust evidence that doctors refer more to specialists of their same gender, a tendency known as homophily. I propose a new measure of homophily that is invariant to differences between the genders in the propensity to refer or receive referrals. I show that biased referrals are predominantly driven by physicians’ decisions rather than by endogenous sorting of physicians or patients or by gender differences in the labor supply. As 75% of doctors are men, estimates suggest biased referrals generate a 5% lower demand for female relative to male specialists, pointing to a positive externality for increased female participation in medicine.
Discussant(s)
Rajiv Sharma
,
Portland State University
Dan Zeltzer
,
Tel Aviv University and IZA
Heather Sarsons
,
Harvard University
JEL Classifications
  • I1 - Health
  • J1 - Demographic Economics