American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Social Capital and Political Accountability
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 5,
no. 2, May 2013
(pp. 222–50)
Abstract
We investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic well-being and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share values and beliefs that foster cooperation are more likely to vote based on criteria of social welfare rather than narrow personal interest. We frame this intuition into a simple model of political agency and take it to the data using information on the criminal prosecutions and absenteeism rates of Italian members of Parliament. Empirical evidence shows that the electoral punishment of these misbehaviors is considerably larger in districts with higher social capital. (JEL D72, I31, Z13)Citation
Nannicini, Tommaso, Andrea Stella, Guido Tabellini, and Ugo Troiano. 2013. "Social Capital and Political Accountability." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5 (2): 222–50. DOI: 10.1257/pol.5.2.222Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- I31 General Welfare
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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