American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Contracts for Agents with Biased Beliefs: Some Theory and an Experiment
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 5,
no. 3, August 2013
(pp. 124–56)
Abstract
This paper experimentally tests the predictions of a principal-agent model in which the agent has biased beliefs about his ability. Overconfi dent workers are found to earn lower wages than underconfi dent ones because they overestimate their expected payoff , and principals adjust their off ers accordingly. Moreover, the profi t-maximizing contract distorts e ffort by varying incentives according to self-con fidence, although only the most successful principals use this strategy. These fi ndings have implications for the labor market; in particular, self-con fidence is often correlated with gender, implying that principals would prefer to hire men over women simply because they are more overconfi dent.Citation
Sautmann, Anja. 2013. "Contracts for Agents with Biased Beliefs: Some Theory and an Experiment." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (3): 124–56. DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.3.124Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
- D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
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