American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 4,
no. 2, May 2012
(pp. 77–103)
Abstract
We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner. (JEL C71, D81, D83)Citation
Agranov, Marina, and Andrew Schotter. 2012. "Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4 (2): 77–103. DOI: 10.1257/mic.4.2.77Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C71 Cooperative Games
- D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
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