American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 3,
no. 4, November 2011
(pp. 107–42)
Abstract
Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a "dating" process in which all partners enjoy the full potential equilibrium gains from each match. By contrast, maximizing social welfare in non-stochastic repeated games with rematching requires that players burn money or otherwise fail to realize all potential equilibrium gains. Comparative statics on welfare and turnover are also provided, consistent with documented patterns of "survivorship bias" and "honeymoon." (JEL C72, C73, C78)Citation
McAdams, David. 2011. "Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3 (4): 107–42. DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.4.107Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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