American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Judicial Mechanism Design
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 15,
no. 3, August 2023
(pp. 243–70)
Abstract
This paper proposes a mechanism-design approach to study criminal justice systems. We derive properties of optimal mechanisms for two notions of welfare distinguished by their treatment of deterrence. These properties provide insights into the effects of defendants' private information about their guilt; highlight forces that may underlie certain features of existing systems, such as plea bargaining and binary verdicts and the separation of fact-finding and sentencing; and indicate directions for possible improvements of criminal trials, such as varying the standard for conviction across crimes.Citation
Siegel, Ron, and Bruno Strulovici. 2023. "Judicial Mechanism Design." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (3): 243–70. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220100Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K41 Litigation Process
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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