American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 15,
no. 3, August 2023
(pp. 354–86)
Abstract
A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the game may be used to predict its outcome y based on past values of (x, y). In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous formation of sunspots.Citation
Argenziano, Rossella, and Itzhak Gilboa. 2023. "Similarity Nash Equilibria in Statistical Games." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15 (3): 354–86. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220049Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
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