American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 16,
no. 2, May 2024
(pp. 39–61)
Abstract
We study experimentally the effect of multigame contact on cooperation, with each subject playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if each of the two games is played with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, multigame contact does not increase overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acting like a double-edged sword, in the sense that subjects link decisions across games and, consequently, mutual cooperation and mutual defection in both games become more likely.Citation
Laferrière, Vincent, Joao Montez, Catherine Roux, and Christian Thöni. 2024. "Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 16 (2): 39–61. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210377Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
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