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  4. November 2022
  5. Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice

  • Andreas Kleiner
  • Benny Moldovanu
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 14, no. 4, November 2022
(pp. 583–615)
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Abstract

We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a "left-right" axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed? We assume that preferences are single peaked on a tree and study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting process, the tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides with sincere, unsophisticated voting. Based on inference results and revealed preference arguments, we illustrate the empirical implications for two case studies.

Citation

Kleiner, Andreas, and Benny Moldovanu. 2022. "Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (4): 583–615. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200147

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • F15 Economic Integration
  • J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
  • J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
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