American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 14,
no. 3, August 2022
(pp. 441–79)
Abstract
We study quadratic payoff common-value sequential-move aggregative games with signaling. Applications include Stackelberg quantity-setting, public good contribution, common resource, gas emission, and manufacturer-retailer games. Whereas efficient aggregation of information occurs in large Stackelberg markets, it does not occur in the four remaining large markets. If all agents share their information with their followers, expected welfare increases in the Stackelberg and supply chain games and it decreases in the remaining three games. Finally, we characterize the conditions for payoffs and welfare to increase with more precise private or public information. We also provide robustness checks when the values are private.Citation
Cumbul, Eray. 2022. "Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (3): 441–79. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190059Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- D43 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- H41 Public Goods
- Q21 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply; Prices
- Q54 Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
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