American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 13,
no. 3, August 2021
(pp. 112–23)
Abstract
The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann and the Savage framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes.Citation
Billot, Antoine, and Xiangyu Qu. 2021. "Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13 (3): 112–23. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180344Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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