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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. February 2019
  5. Competition in Treasury Auctions

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Competition in Treasury Auctions

  • Helmut Elsinger
  • Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
  • Christine Zulehner
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 11, no. 1, February 2019
(pp. 157–84)
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Abstract

We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance. We find robust evidence that bidders' surplus dropped sharply after EU accession, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. The difference can be explained by reduced form estimates not taking into account the increase in valuations upon EU accession.

Citation

Elsinger, Helmut, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, and Christine Zulehner. 2019. "Competition in Treasury Auctions." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11 (1): 157–84. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170039

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • E63 Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
  • G21 Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
  • H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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