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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. May 2017
  5. Dynamic Agenda Setting

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Dynamic Agenda Setting

  • Ying Chen
  • Hülya Eraslan
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 9, no. 2, May 2017
(pp. 1–32)
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Abstract

A party in power can address a limited number of issues. What issues to address--the party's agenda--has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent addresses one issue among many and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We show that no strategic manipulation arises without checks and balances and identify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, seizing the moment, steering, and preemption with checks and balances depending on how power fluctuates. We also discuss efficiency implications.

Citation

Chen, Ying, and Hülya Eraslan. 2017. "Dynamic Agenda Setting." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (2): 1–32. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150298

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D78 Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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