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  4. November 2018
  5. Political Kludges

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Political Kludges

  • Keiichi Kawai
  • Ruitian Lang
  • Hongyi Li
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 10, no. 4, November 2018
(pp. 131–58)
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Abstract

This paper explores the origins of policy complexity. It studies a model where policy is difficult to undo because policy elements are entangled with each other. Policy complexity may accumulate as successive policymakers layer new rules upon existing policy. Complexity emerges and persists in balanced democratic polities, when policymakers are ideologically extreme, and when legislative frictions impede policymaking. Complexity begets complexity: simple policies remain simple, whereas complex policies grow more complex. Patience is not always a virtue: farsighted policymakers may engage in obstructionism, deliberately introducing complex policies to hinder future opponents.

Citation

Kawai, Keiichi, Ruitian Lang, and Hongyi Li. 2018. "Political Kludges." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10 (4): 131–58. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150242

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
  • D78 Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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