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  4. February 2017
  5. Matching Patterns When Group Size Exceeds Two

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Matching Patterns When Group Size Exceeds Two

  • Christian Ahlin
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 9, no. 1, February 2017
(pp. 352–84)
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Abstract

We study one-sided matching when groups with n > 2 members are being formed. Type-complementarity rules out all but the rank-ordered grouping. Type-substitutability (for example, matching to share risk) rules out much less. It requires that every two groups must be "intertwined," in that each dominates the other at some rank. Intertwined matching is necessary and, in one context, sufficient for any grouping to be a potential equilibrium. But there are many intertwined matching patterns when n > 2. Thus, substitutability can be observationally similar to complementarity; we demonstrate this by showing that dyadic regressions can register intertwined (negative assortative) matching as homogeneous matching.

Citation

Ahlin, Christian. 2017. "Matching Patterns When Group Size Exceeds Two." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (1): 352–84. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150080

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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