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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. May 2016
  5. Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms

  • Peter Chen
  • Michael Egesdal
  • Marek Pycia
  • M. Bumin Yenmez
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 8, no. 2, May 2016
(pp. 202–14)
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Abstract

We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. One important implication is that when agents on one side of the market have unit demand, no stable matching mechanism is less manipulable than another for all agents. (JEL C78, D82)

Citation

Chen, Peter, Michael Egesdal, Marek Pycia, and M. Bumin Yenmez. 2016. "Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8 (2): 202–14. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150035

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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