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  4. May 2017
  5. Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections

  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Demian Pouzo
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 9, no. 2, May 2017
(pp. 54–75)
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Abstract

We introduce a solution concept in the context of large elections with private information by embedding a model of boundedly rational voters into an otherwise standard equilibrium setting. A retrospective voting equilibrium (RVE) formalizes the idea that voters evaluate alternatives based on past performance. Since counterfactual outcomes are not observed, the sample from which voters learn is potentially biased, leading to systematically biased beliefs in equilibrium. We provide an explicit learning foundation for RVE and contrast it to standard solution concepts in the literature.

Citation

Esponda, Ignacio, and Demian Pouzo. 2017. "Conditional Retrospective Voting in Large Elections." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (2): 54–75. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140283

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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