American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Achieving Cooperation under Privacy Concerns
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 7,
no. 3, August 2015
(pp. 142–73)
Abstract
Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount, then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation, the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about privacy, and so revelation of evidence that does not result in cooperation is costly. We show that in equilibrium evidence can be exchanged both incrementally and all at once, and identify conditions under which the different rates of evidence exchange are optimal. (JEL C71, D83)Citation
Dziuda, Wioletta, and Ronen Gradwohl. 2015. "Achieving Cooperation under Privacy Concerns." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (3): 142–73. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140056Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C71 Cooperative Games
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment