Journal of Economic Perspectives
ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)
Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 15,
no. 2, Spring 2001
(pp. 63–80)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
U.S. v. Microsoft involved the allegation that Microsoft violated the U.S.antitrust laws by engaging in a variety of practices aimed at excluding rivals and potential rivals, most notably the Netscape Corporation’s Navigator web browser. The government contended that these efforts were designed to protect Microsoft’s Windows monopoly of Intel-compatible operating systems against any devices or software that might lessen the necessity of using Windows. In this article, I discuss an important subset of Microsoft’s practices: its use of contracts involving various forms of exclusivity for its web browser Internet Explorer and its attempts at tying the use of Internet Explorer to its Windows operating system.Citation
Whinston, Michael, D. 2001. "Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2): 63–80. DOI: 10.1257/jep.15.2.63JEL Classification
- L86 Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- K21 Antitrust Law
- K41 Litigation Process
- L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L51 Economics of Regulation
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