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  3. Journal of Economic Perspectives
  4. Summer 1999
  5. Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty

  • James Alm
  • Stacy Dickert-Conlin
  • Leslie A. Whittington
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 13, no. 3, Summer 1999
(pp. 193–204)
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Abstract

Many government programs have implicit penalties or subsidies for marriage. For example, many couples pay higher income taxes when married than their combined tax liabilities as single filers, while many other couples receive a marriage subsidy because their joint taxes fall with marriage. Likewise, most low-income couples are eligible for higher welfare benefits if they are separated rather than married. This article discusses the marriage penalty, with a particular focus on tax and transfer programs. Why does it exist? Who faces it? To what extent does it affect marriage and labor market behavior? What tradeoffs are involved in reducing it?

Citation

Alm, James, Stacy Dickert-Conlin, and Leslie A. Whittington. 1999. "Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13 (3): 193–204. DOI: 10.1257/jep.13.3.193

JEL Classification

  • J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
  • H31 Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household
  • H24 Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
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