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  4. Summer 2005
  5. Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance

  • Randall Morck
  • Bernard Yeung
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 19, no. 3, Summer 2005
(pp. 163–180)
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Abstract

In 2003, the United States enacted a tax reform that reduced, but did not eliminate, individual dividend income taxes. Cutting the dividend tax deprives corporate insiders of a justification for retaining earnings to build unprofitable corporate empires. But not eliminating it entirely preserves an advantage for institutional investors, who can put pressure on underperforming managers. This balance is broadly appropriate in the United States—whose large companies are freestanding and widely held. In addition, preserving the existing tax on intercorporate dividends, in place since the Roosevelt era, discourages the pyramidal corporate groups commonplace in other countries, and preserves America's large corporate sector of free-standing widely held firms.

Citation

Morck, Randall, and Bernard Yeung. 2005. "Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (3): 163–180. DOI: 10.1257/089533005774357752

JEL Classification

  • G35 Payout Policy
  • H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
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