This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. Forthcoming Articles
  5. Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance

  • Arno Apffelstaedt ⓡ
  • Jana Freundt
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (Forthcoming)

Abstract

Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which participants distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less likely to voluntarily comply with a rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magnitude as removing the election altogether and imposing a rule exogenously. Our experiment shows how corrupting democratic processes impacts economic behavior and sheds light on factors that may underlie “rule legitimacy”.

Downloads