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The Price of Power: Costs of Political Corruption in Indian Electricity
Meera Mahadevan
American Economic Review (Forthcoming)
Abstract
Politicians may target public goods to benefit their constituents, at the expense
of others. I study corruption in the context of Indian electricity and estimate
the welfare consequences. Using new administrative billing data and close-election
regression discontinuities, I show that billed electricity consumption is lower for
constituencies of the winning party by almost 40%, while actual consumption, measured
by nighttime lights, is higher. I document the covert way in which politicians
subsidize constituents by manipulating bills. These actions have substantial welfare
implications, with an efficiency loss of $0.9 billion, leading to unreliable electricity
supply and significant negative consequences for development.