By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.
Polity Size and Local Government Performance: Evidence from India
Veda Narasimhan
Jeffrey Weaver
American Economic Review (Forthcoming)
Abstract
Developing countries have increasingly decentralized power to local governments.
This paper studies the implications of a central element of decentralization – polity size
– using population-based discontinuities that determine local government boundaries
for over 100,000 Indian villages. Over the short and long-run, individuals allocated
into local governments with smaller populations have better access to public goods.
We provide suggestive evidence that these results are related to heightened civic engagement
and stronger political incentives, but not to other mechanisms such as elite
capture.